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THE BASIS OF SOCIALITY.

To join the hue and cry against Spencer's analogical comparison of society with an organism, though popular in certain sociological circles, is paying but scant respect to the real value of one of the pioneer attempts to secure a scientific basis for that foundling science—sociology. As a *heuristisches Princip* its most perdurable value lies in the fact that it has materially aided in the consideration of the sociological as a continuation of the biological. Strictly speaking, the biological probably includes human interaction or the social phenomena of human life, but for the purposes of a division of labor in the scientific world there has been a strong unconscious, though some unkind critic will say all too conscious, current in favor of founding a new discipline and department of human knowledge. Certainly the problems are ample enough to justify the division, and despite the similarity of laws the differences are sufficient to mark the boundaries of a new province of scientific research. Darwin's *Origin of Species* was really a description of organic technology, and the extra-organic sense and motor organs of social evolution are but the extensions of the tools and instruments which were so successful in the organic conflict. Organic heredity is continued in social heredity, the instinctive giving way, as second in importance, to oral and written tradition and the transmission of institutional life. The organic gains of the individual become objectified and perpetuated for all time in the environment, and an attainable object of possession for all socially minded people. The language of gestures of organic biology becomes the language of symbols with its priceless economy of time and labor. These laws and many others provide ample scope for the most untiring laborer and the most brilliant genius in the field of research. Spencer's analogy, therefore, is insufficient, and the attempt to base sociology on the specifications laid down for an organism is but little superior to the attempts of certain other sociologists who find all sociology bound up in the consciousness

of kind or in the psychological process of imitation. Spencer, however, did point to the continuity of law as is evidenced in the biological and sociological worlds. Instead of an organism he could have used a species with much greater effect, for in a species are found, although in a crude and rudimentary stage, the first beginnings of social life.

One of the most striking, and yet at the same time one of the least observed, facts about specific action is the pre-eminence of the specific as such. The individual is secondary to the species. Instincts, which are characteristically the grand trunk line of transmission and continuity in the lower orders of the zoölogical series, are peculiar and very important in this, that they are always in their origin and bloom for the benefit of the *species* to which the animal may belong which possesses the instinct. They are of benefit to the individual only secondarily, in so far as that individual may be of benefit to the species. The mother gives up her life for the child. She dies, but the child, and through it the species, lives. The salmon struggles up the Columbia river for a thousand miles, is torn and battered by the rocks and waterfalls on the long and weary journey, lays its eggs, and dies; but the race lives on, although at the loss and sacrifice of one of its best members. The long history of the mammalia or *mothers* is a record of innumerable such examples. Of course, it is not necessarily true that the individual performs an instinctive act *in order that* the species may be benefited, but the persistent fact remains that in the long run only those species and individuals survive which act in such a way that the species may be further propagated. Instincts are always for species or race preservation. They are specific, altruistic, other-regarding, profoundly social. They may not be all consciously such, but in their origin and bloom they are in their final import intensely social. It is a question of survival. It is a question of propagation and of the safety and welfare of the propagated. The individuals of a species which do not propagate obviously nullify the probability of like descendants. That which militates against the species thereby militates against the survival of the members of that species. The species that survives is characterized by the

fact that its members act in such a manner that descendants are provided, and also provided *for* in some way or other. The goal of their activities is the young and their welfare. The young are heirs of all efforts directly or indirectly (*Erziehung, eine Fortsetzung der Erzeugung*). In the highest mammalian species, man, art, religion, and science are, in the long run, directly or indirectly, means for more certain perpetuation of the species and the more certain welfare of the same. The rank of a species is determined by the degree of such care for the young. The survival of the fittest means the survival of the parental, and all efforts are to be judged according to a parental standard. The greatest good to the greatest number must also be interpreted in a similar manner, not as the greatest happiness of the greatest number, but as such parental conduct, direct or indirect, as will be most conducive to the propagation and welfare of the species. As Herbert Spencer says, the continued life of the species is in every case the end to which all other ends are secondary (*Principles of Sociology*, Vol. I, p. 591). Through many stages of provincial patriotism and group-exclusiveness we have forged on until on the not far distant sky-line we see a state outlined where all humanity is our fatherland. All conduct is judged by nature according to the standard of survival.

In an organism, to recur to the Spencerian analogy, the conduct of the parts is determined by the welfare of the whole. That part which is detrimental to the whole organism is suicidal in tendency either immediately or mediately through the destruction of the whole organism. The safety of the parts lies in their general social efficiency. Their existence and perpetuation lie in their service to the general organization of which they form a part. To this extent an organism is similar to society, and to this extent is Spencer's analogy pertinent. Neither the science of sociology nor the science of ethical conduct, it is evident, can be drawn from the individual as such. Plato, it seems, saw this when he endeavored to derive the true significance of justice and righteousness from the state, and not from the individual.

It seems plain, then, that the individual as such has no

rights. The rights he may possess are attained by him through social service. It is through society that he acquires whatever rights he may claim. There was more sociological truth than cynicism in the reply of the French judge to a prisoner who excused his crime on the plea that "a man must live." "Pardon me," came the rejoinder, "but I don't see the necessity." The inalienable rights of the individual are *nil* excepting in so far as society may grant them. The individual pure and simple, *der Mensch überhaupt*, is a fiction. All which tends to survive is an organized whole of interacting parts.

The basis of sociality and the material of the science of sociology are therefore found in the interaction of parts which constitute a more or less organized whole. The organized whole, or society, is not something different from the interacting parts; the interacting parts *are* the society. The social is not the product of the interaction; it *is* the interaction. Each part is a partner or *socius* or *Theilnehmer*, the service or sociality of one part being complementary to the service of the other parts. Thus the social is reciprocal service. The social arises when the *Nebeneinander* becomes the *Miteinander*, when the anatomical becomes the physiological. The sociality consists in the correlated, co-ordinated activity of the integrated parts. Sociality is conduct, service rendered, not a consciousness of kind nor a feeling of sympathy, excepting in so far as they may be useful for the conduct of the parts.

Pitting the individual against society is an instance of crude sociological thought. Its ambiguity is at once manifest when one remembers that society does not exist as something separate from the integrated functions of the parts. It may be said that in the long run only those parts are allowed to exist which contribute to the social or organic welfare. The case in which possibly an individual may be pitted against the society is when the function of a part is prejudicial to organic survival. Such conduct is manifestly suicidal and, comparatively speaking, non-transmissible. It is, however, still a matter of sociality in that it is the service rendered by a part in an organized whole. It is, however, to be classed in what may be termed pathological as

opposed to normal sociology. The truest part of man, the best and most righteous, is that which is most specific and most altruistic, that which contributes most to social organic welfare, which again must be defined in terms of survival of well-provided-for progeny. True selfishness or sin is that service rendered the whole which is for the individual's own immediate benefit and which is harmful to the body politic of which it forms a part. It may be incidentally mentioned at this point that on this basis a standard of values can be established in ethical matters—an impossible matter if the ethical standard is one of motives or happiness. The action of an educated man who can foresee future results is of more value than that of an ignorant man ruled by a few unbending motives.

The struggle for existence is a secondary law, being subordinate and subservient to the law of social service. The social service of the parts is improved by the betterment of the parts. Hence the worth of personality and individuality; hence the struggle for freedom in history. Self-preservation, self-control, and the perfection of one's own personality are duties, and imperative duties at that, but not categorical imperatives. "The perfection of one's powers" is, after all, only a means of obeying the categorical imperative of social service. It is here that we find the supreme court of appeal, from which there is no recourse. It may also be well to point out that from the biological and sociological standpoint it is not so much a question of the survival of individuals as a question of the survival of the best combination of parts—a much wider view.

This grounding of the social in the universal phenomena of the division of labor throws a strong light on certain prevalent theories as to the nature of sociology. One of the most prominent characteristics of this division of labor is the *differentiation of parts*. Integration of parts means the connected play of these parts, so that if one functions the others are affected. Differentiation from other organs means individuality and difference; integration is not necessarily an interaction of similar parts, but rather an interaction of the different parts. The phenomena of integration or sociality are therefore inadequately described as

"a consciousness of kind, a knowledge of resemblances, or a knowledge of like-mindedness" (Giddings).

Social life is mirrored in a football game. Each player has his function; each player thinks and acts his separate part. The signal given, the ball is snapped, each man leaps to his place, the fake pass is made, the proper interference aids the man who makes the run down the side lines, and the touch-down is made to the cheering of enthusiastic partisans. *Each man acts, I say, his part, and the element they have in common is the goal.* The common aim—the success of the team and the winning of the game—does not necessarily mean a common or similar method of action. Solidarity does not of necessity mean similarity, nor does community life mean common thoughts and actions. Nor in adult society, the training for which is the rational ground for play, do we find the process materially different. The material of social organization is not consciousness of kind, nor is it mainly such. The action of the mob, to which reference is so lovingly made by certain sociologists, is generally an instance in which the welfare of the whole is lost sight of, in which the single person becomes a unit in an *aggregation*, and in which there is a general return to the homogeneity of primitive conditions. The striking thing about a mob is not its social but its unsocial character. With the dispersion of the mob there begins again the process of differentiation and integration—true sociality. Of certain pigeons it is reported that they become extraordinarily stupid and incautious as soon as they become a part of great numbers in flight, but that they become wary, intelligent, and cautious when they are alone. Identification of the individual with the collective mass reduces it to the average level and causes temporary atrophy of certain more highly specialized qualities. The same phenomena are often observable in men and women who take refuge from their doubts and uncertainties in the infallible doctrines of the Roman Catholic church.

Consciousness of kind is characteristic of the lowest stages of society, and indicates a low level in a more highly evolved society. The struggle for existence implies a struggle of conflicting interests, different schools of thought and action. It is

also a biological truth that the struggle is greatest between the members of the same species. It is also not necessary that each individual partner should be conscious of the common goal, provided his conduct tends that way. His motives may be wrong, but his conduct must be right. Correct motives provide, however, some guarantee of persistency of conduct. The individual lives for himself, but in so doing must serve others. Selfishness necessarily generates altruism. The chalk cliffs of the infusoria are the result of the individualistic action of each of the infusoria, the infusorium being typical of egoism.¹ Baldwin discriminates between the substance, content, stuff, or material of society, and the functional method or process of organization of the social material. He describes the social substance or content as follows: "The matter of social organization consists of thoughts; by which is meant all sorts of intellectual states, such as imagination, knowledge, and informations." This "matter," he thinks, is found only in social groups, which alone, therefore, can be called societies. Animal communities he would call "companies." The functional method or process of organization of the social material he finds in the process of imitation which is subjectively contained in the "dialectic of personal growth."

It is evident that the "substance, content, stuff, or material" of society is not the consciousness of kind, as Giddings affirms; neither can it be said that the functional method or process of organization of the social material is mainly a process of imitation, as Baldwin asserts. The process is rather that of division of labor, using that term to indicate both the process of differentiation and integration. The transmission of the social heritage, the introduction of the young into adult social ways, may and does involve a large amount of imitation, but even there, again, it should be remarked that imitation is but one subdivision of the larger process of suggestion. Suggestion may be one of the methods by which the young acquire social ways, but it does not therefore rise to the supreme rank and importance of the social way itself. Again, imitation, and in a still larger way suggestion in all its forms, is one method of social service, as, for instance, in

¹ IHERING, *Der Zweck im Recht*, 3d ed. (Leipzig, 1893), p. 467.

the influence exerted by leaders, reformers, and their likes. It is, however, not to be confounded with the larger and more fundamental process of division of labor. It is brilliant, but wholly inadequate, to say with Tarde, "Socialité, c'est l'imitativité."²

The most useful *variation* tends to survive, and hence Bailey's term, "the survival of the unlike." Variation is one of the most important processes in nature, for on this process are built the innumerable possibilities of the division of labor. Darwin's problem was, of course, the origin of differences. Linnæus, if he were still to pursue his plan of an inventory of nature as a species of natural bookkeeping, would be appalled at the number of species. Instead of the very modest forty thousand species comprising the sum total of all living species as computed by Biberg, writing in 1749 in Linnæus's *Amoenitates Academicæ*, Riley concludes that "to say that there are ten million species of insects in the world would be, in my judgment, a moderate estimate." The differentiation process is proceeding as rapidly as at any period in time past; in fact, the strong probability is that it is increasing more rapidly. That organism is likely to spread most rapidly which differs most widely from all its fellows, because the field is free of competitors and there is the least impediment to its progress. This principle has been called by Darwin the divergence of character. A new character, or a new combination of characters, in any organism may tend to give such an organism an immense advantage because of the monopoly-privileges it enjoys. Freedom and liberty is the toleration of differences, affording a chance for natural or acquired aptitudes. A variation is generally useful because it accomplishes something new, something which the homogeneous mass could not do before the variation occurred. Progress is generally such differential interstitial growth.

Differentiation, however, is not invariably the open sesame to success. The secret of success lies in the degree of adaptation, and success, it may again be repeated, must be interpreted in terms of survival. We commonly say that when certain plants are transferred northward they tend to degenerate by

² TARDE, *Les lois de l'imitation*, p. 75.

becoming dwarfed and by losing some of their highly developed specialities. They have a tendency, like old varieties of plants, to assume some primitive or inferior type. Degeneracy or deterioration is, however, a relative term, return to a simpler form, *i. e.*, a decrease in the differentiation of the plant, being often the successful means employed to secure a further lease of life. In the same way with human beings, poverty often places an embargo on differentiation. The highly developed individual, stricken with poverty, must needs forego the satisfaction of many tastes, and revert to a more common and primitive type.

The utility of differentiation is, however, manifest on all sides. Death entered into the world with all its blessings, the old undying types giving place to the possibility of an ever-increasing variation. Sex entered, according to Weissmann, and increased the number of combinations and variations. Plants become annuals and biennials from a perennial condition. Changes in the plant and animal world meet the changes of the seasons, the temperature, the food supply, and the changing demands of the rest of the plant and animal world. Bailey suggestively remarks that the development of life took two divergent lines—that of the circular arrangement of parts and that of bilateralism. The first line, developing in obedience to a peripheral or rotate type of organization, ends in the echinoderms and some of the mollusks. This type reached its zenith and, according to Cope, has left no line of descent. The progressive and regnant type of animal life appeared in the vermes, or true worms, forms which are characterized by a two-sided or bilateral, and therefore more or less longitudinal, structure. By this means greater differentiation was made possible. A cephalic or head-forming evolution resulted from the bilateralism, and a specialization of the senses and central nervous system without parallel ensued. The extensive specialization of the sense and motor organs of the body, although marvelous, is carried to still greater limits by means of extra-organic instruments. The evolution of organs is continued in technic.¹

The differentiation being given, integration or organization

¹ OTTO WIENER, *Die Erweiterung unserer Sinne*, Leipzig, 1900.

becomes possible. The more absolutely alike the parts may be, the less likelihood there will be of a superior organization. The Quakers, for instance, possess little capacity for political organization, because of the uniformity of the individuals of that persuasion. The benefits accruing from division of labor are lost, viz., the avoidance of waste effort, the increase in amount of work performed, the improvement in quality, the adaptation of the work to the natural aptitude of the workers, the greater security of the species or society, etc. Thus integration may not necessarily mean the introduction of a caste or military system; it may not follow as a logical consequence that there is an *Ueber-* and *Untereinander*, but it does imply a *Miteinander*. It may not necessitate equality or similarity of parts, but it does imply efficiency of service of the parts, which efficiency is generally in proportion to the difference in the parts.¹ The survival of the unlike defines the fittest to be the unlike, and if, as Roux says, there is a *Kampf der Theile*, it is, we may add, *im Interesse des Ganzen*. Every man is his brother's keeper in the sense that each specialist must needs be supported by other specialists. Organizations, institutions, culture, and civilization must be defined, not as products of interaction, but as such and such interactions of different parts.

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¹ Hegel's statement that he who pursues a special occupation or profession does not lower himself, but only thus becomes *ein rechter Mensch*, has much truth in it.